Modern magicians

Recently, I have been asked to write a non-tech article about pentesting and vulnerability research. As it might be interesting to some readers, I decided to share a few fragments here.

"Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic"
Arthur C. Clarke

Since my early days with computers, I have always cited this Clarke's Law to people astonished by technology artifacts. These days, I am still using the same quote while explaining my job as a pentester to non-technical persons. Beyond the shadow of doubt, security testing is far away from magic being a complex technology-based process. It requires a proper mix of scientific know-how, creativity and expertise on cutting-edge technologies. Staying on top of the latest in vulnerabilities and computer attacks requires continual study, in-depth research, as well as continual discussions and feedback with fellow security professionals.

"0days are a device to prove that a client is unready to handle the unknown"
Pete Herzog

Understanding incoming threats or even discovering new vulnerabilities gives a crucial advantage over potential aggressors. It allows system owners to protect their installations in spite of the public spread of critical flaws. In the long term, it also provides important insights which are useful to design more secure technologies for the future. As 0days are a product of an intensive research work, vulnerability research activities are essential for pentesting.

"I’ve always said that hacking is not about skill set. It is mostly about dedication, patience and a lot of motivation"
Pdp, GNUCITIZEN

Hacking is about skills, dedication, patience, passion and creativity. Properly mixing these elements makes possible to experiment with computers (and not only!). During a pentest, trying to understand how systems work and using them in an unconventional way is the key to circumvent protections and exploit vulnerabilities. After all, security testing is just about mastering technology and doing magic tricks.

[Confidence0902] The Glass Cage - Virtualization Security

My trip in Poland has been very interesting: I've met a lot of people, got back in touch with Ikki and got some weird flu which taught me that giving a presentation when you've got high fever might not be the brightest idea.
This is presentation I gave at Confidence 0902, with an overview on various attack paths against virtualization technologies. One of the most interesting things, I think, is the mitm to remote code execution attack against Virtual Infrastructure Client. I've also announced VASTO, a project we're working on at Secure Network.
Any comment is warmly welcome, but please if you were at confidence do not ask me how many coffee I had before the presentation (10 people already asked).

Virtual Appliances forensic - Part1

In the last months I've been most busy exploring virtualization security issues, which anyway I'm going to present at CONFidence and IT Underground Warsaw in a couple of weeks. However, I wanted to share with you an interesting piece of information I've uncovered while exploring some common virtual appliances.

As you surely know, it's really, really hard to make sure that a file is gone from your file system. You have to remove every reference, every tiny bit of information, or it might be uncovered: data structures, actual data left on the disk, backups of the data structures and so on. File System forensics is concerned with precisely this matter, and forensic software are capable of doing wonders when it comes to recovering deleted that from disks.

Well, the same is true for virtual appliances. While some vendors might decide that it's worth cleaning up and shrinking the disk before shipping virtual appliances, most will not. As a result, you can find gold inside those disks: setup scripts, configuration and installation stuff and all sort of "backend knowledge". This is quite hard to extract from actual machines, which are often disk-imaged and quite hard to reach with traditional tools (some are missing cd roms, for instance, and vendors do not really like you opening up their boxes). However, with virtual appliances it's really really easy to do so.

An example? VMware Studio virtual appliance, the virtual appliance which should be used to build other virtual appliances, has got references of the internal deb repository used to install the - custom - VMware Studio software on it, and traces of the actual debian packages as well.

More data on VA security in the near future, likely after my talk!